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R&D&I Tax Incentives in the European Union 
and State Aid Rules 
Although tax incentives are an effective tool for 
promoting R&D&I, depending on their design 
they may qualify as State aid (article 1 07(1) of 
the TFEU) unless exempted by the Commission 
(article 1 07(3)). This article discusses the role of 
State aid rules in respect of R&D&I incentives 
and the need to ensure R&D&I promotion 
policies in Europe are on equal footing with the 
rest of the world, thus ensuring a level playing 
field for European undertakings in global 
markets. 
1. R&D&IInvestment Promotion in the European 
Union 
Article 179( 1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) (2007) 1 hails R&D&F promotion as a 
common interest objective in the European Union: 
The Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific 
and technological bases by achieving a European research area in 
which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate 
freely, and encouraging it to become more competitive, including 
in its industry, while promoting all the research activities deemed 
necessary by virtue of other Chapters of the Treaties. 
The Europe 2020 strategy,3 however, puts R&D&I at its 
heart by setting a target of overall R&D&I spending of 
3% of gross domestic product (GDP). The Commission 
Communication EU 2020 outlines a clear need to improve 
the conditions for private R&D&I in the European Union. 
R&D&I spending in Europe is currently below 2%, com-
pared to 2.6% in the United States and 3.4% in Japan, 
mainly as a result of lower levels of private investment.4 
Finally, the European Commission's project Horizon 
20205 (the financial instrumentofEU 2020) labels R&D&I 
promotion as one of the main outstanding elements of its 
growth and development strategy. 
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National R&D&I policies, which are being developed 
in parallel to Horizon 2020, are called on to also take a 
decisive role in promoting R&D&I. Research and inno-
vation generally thrive best in open and competitive 
markets. Market failures may, however, hamper the deliv-
ery of optimal levels of research and innovation. State aid, 
among other policy tools, can tackle market failures and 
create incentives for market participants, thus facilitating 
research and innovation. 
Despite the positive role played by national R&D&I poli-
cies, some measures included in these national policies 
may be labelled as State aid, as they may affect free com-
petition and can even reduce a competitor's incentive to 
invest. State aid also distorts competition and strong com-
petition is, at the same time, a crucial factor for market-
driven stimulation of investment in R&D&I. Therefore, 
State aid measures must be carefully designed in order to 
limit distortions. Otherwise, State aid can become coun-
terproductive and reduce the overall level ofR&D&I and 
economic growth. 
The Commission considers that an increase in the level of 
R&D&I activity in the Community is in the Community's 
common interest, as it is expected to significantly contrib-
ute to growth, prosperity and sustainable development. In 
this context, the Commission recognizes that State aid has 
a positive role to play when it is well targeted and creates 
the right incentive for undertakings to increase R&D&I. 
Nevertheless, State aid may also lead to significant distor-
tions of competition, which must be taken into consid-
eration. 
This article examines the idea of supporting R&D&I 
measures to attract investment (section 2.), State aid rules 
(section 3.), the interplay ofR&D&I promotion and State 
aid policy (section 4.), R&D&I tax incentives as State aid 
(section 5.), provides conclusions (section 6.) and ends 
with a series of recommendations (section 7.). 
2. Supporting R&D&I Measures and Attracting 
Investment 
Investment in R&D&I is undertaken by firms based on 
the expectation that such investment will bring future 
benefits, such as lower production costs or higher reve-
nues. Unfortunately, private investment in R&D&I may 
be below the optimal level, especially when the return on 
investment is very uncertain. In these situations, govern-
ment intervention can enhance welfare. The main justifi-
cation for state intervention in the promotion of R&D&I 
activities is that, under pure market conditions, such activ-
ities are underinvested in because of a high level of risk 
of such investments and large spillover effects to society. 
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Diagram 1: Direct government funding of BERD 
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Source: OECD Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 23 October 2013, available at www.oecd.org/sti!rd-tax-stats.htm. 
Therefore, in order to correct for the lack of provision of 
R&D&I activities, governments intervene. 
While increasing the volume of R&D&I activities is the 
primary policy objective, governments also often antici-
pate an impact on the competitiveness of their industry 
and regard R&D&I incentives as a tool to improve the in-
ternational attractiveness of their country as a location 
for innovation. Governments can choose among various 
instruments to promote business R&D&I. In addition to 
giving grants or loans and procuring R&D&I, many gov-
ernments also provide tax incentives. 
Tax incentives and direct funding are the two main instru-
ments currently used in many countries to stimulate private 
R&D&I activity. Both belong to a broader package of mea-
sures intended to enhance private research and innovation 
activities, which includes intellectual property (IP) rights, 
public funding of basic research and public provision of 
venture capital. Notwithstanding the wide range of policy 
instruments used to stimulate private R&D&I, the most 
widely used are direct subsidies and tax incentives. More-
over, since labour represents half of the R&D&I expendi-
ture, some countries use labour incentives in order to ease 
the burden on R&D&I labour. 
Tax incentives are an indirect means of supporting 
R&D&I, in contrast to direct government funding ofbusi-
ness R&D&I through grants or contracts. The volume of 
government funding through R&D&I tax incentives is 
significant and can reach a similar magnitude as direct 
R&D&I funding. In several countries, such as Austra-
lia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Japan, Korea and the Netherlands, indirect support 
through tax incentives exceeds direct funding. 
© IBFD 
While direct public funding of private R&D&I is a long-
standing tradition in many countries, tax incentives 
have spread gradually, although subject to some excep-
tions. Canada, Japan and the Netherlands mostly rely on 
tax incentives, while direct funding is still preferred by 
Germany, Finland and Sweden. Other countries combine 
both instruments, for example, Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Portugal, Spain and the United States.6 
National R&D&I spending is influenced by a broad range 
offactors. The decision to support private R&D&I through 
direct financing and/or tax incentives is made by govern-
ments within the context of their political and economic 
systems. 
An interesting study7 determined that R&D&I tax in cent-
ives and direct funding to promote R&D&I are substi-
tutes rather than complements, that is, increased use of 
one reduces the effect of the other on business R&D&I. 
This is so despite evidence that they stimulate different 
R&D&I projects (short-term/ long-term projects, respec-
tively). Thus, an integrated long-term policy framework 
that would provide more consistency in the application 
of various types of incentives and that would coordinate 
the various institutions involved in their design and imple-
mentation would be desirable. For an overview of the level 
of direct R&D funding amongst countries see Diagram 1. 
6. ). Nil!, Design and use oftiscal incentives to promote business RDI ill CREST 
countries: 1111 overview, European Commission joint Research Centre-
Institute for Prospective 'Jcchnological Studies (IPTS), Pinal version, 15 
Sept. 2005 (slightly updated 5 Oct. 2005 and I Mar. 2006), p. 3. 
7. J. Warda, lvleasuring the Value ofR&D&l 1ilx Provisions (A Primer 011 the 
B-index Model ofAnalysis and Comparisons) (28 June 2005). 
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The level of direct R&D funding (BERD)8 varies signifi-
cantly amongst countries 
The focus of this paper now turns to R&D&I tax incent-
ives, most of which are aimed at reducing corporate tax li-
ability. In this respect, two main types can be distinguished: 
tax allowances and R&D&I expenditure tax credits.9 
In general, the preference for one or the other depends 
on the effective marginal tax rate of the entity. For large 
entities, both R&D&I tax credits and allowances can lower 
their overall tax liability. Smaller entities- which may not 
have significant tax liabilities- may benefit more from tax 
allowances, which lower their taxable income. However, 
some countries, for example, Canada, remedy this by 
making R&D&I tax credits refundable and thus of use to 
smaller firms without taxable income. 10 
As a traditional R&D&I tool, "tax credits" provide for 
the possibility to deduct a sum of the total amount a tax-
payer owes to the state. In addition to studying the effi-
cacy of such an instrument, whether or not a tax credit or 
tax allowance - a type of super deduction - may be more 
profitable for enterprises should be analysed. In general, 
the preference for this incentive will depend on the effec-
tive marginal tax rate of the entity. 
R&D&I "tax allowances" are a type of super deduction that 
is not directly offset against R&D&I expenditures. Thus, 
some entities argue that R&D&I tax credits have a greater 
effect on R&D&I decision making than allowances since 
the credit is directly included in the R&D&I budget of a 
firm. Credits are, therefore, more visible to those respons-
ible for research spending within a company and more 
likely to encourage additional R&D&I investment. 11 
The OECD argues that tax allowances are more appro-
priate for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
because they lower taxable income, while tax credits work 
only if there is a relevant tax liability, which is assumed to 
be lower for small entities due to the fact that their eco-
nomic situation is worse off. If both forms of incentives 
are calculated such that the net relief is the same, however, 
i.e. by taking the corporate income tax rate into account, 
then there should be no difference. The problem of profits 
being too low to benefit from a scheme can arise under 
both forms of incentives. 12 
It is a common economic concern with regard to research 
and innovation that important new knowledge and 
R&D&I advances are often generated by "outsiders" and 
new firms, while well established actors are more likely to 
be bound by well established paths of knowledge accu-
8. Govemmentjunded business R&D is the component ofBERD that com-
panies allribule to direct government (central, regional or local) funding 
when describing the sources of funding for intramural R&D expenditures. 
It includes grants, some types ofloans and procurement, but no! R&D tax 
incentives or equil y investments as in the case of public corporations. 
9. For an overview of the main features of R&D tax incentive provisions in 
selected OECD and non-OECD countries in 2013 see hllp:/ /www.oecd. 
org/sli/rd-lax-incentives-provisions.pdf. 
I 0. OECD, 1ilx Incentives for Research mu! Development: TI-ends mzd Issues, 
p. 28 (OECD 2002). 
11. Id., p. 28. 
12. Id. 
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mulation. Standard tax incentives do not provide effective 
support when these companies do not (yet) have profits. 
Certain design features of tax incentives might cope with 
some of their limitations and are increasingly used by a 
range of countries. Carry forward of unused incentives up 
to 10 years is indeed possible for the majority of measures 
in use. The availability of this option is often linked to the 
characteristics of the general tax system. 
Direct cash refunds of unused tax incentives are in use in 
four countries, namely, Austria, France, Norway and the 
United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom limit 
the use of such measures to young companies and com-
panies facing hardship or to SMEs, respectively. Recent 
experience in Norway and the United Kingdom shows 
that the take-up of this option is quite widespread and can 
make up a significant part of the expenses of a scheme. The 
tradability of tax credits, which is possible, for example, 
in the United States does not seem to constitute a rele-
vant design option with regard to European tax incentive 
schemes. Finally, two measures in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands are noteworthy, which avoid the problem of inno-
vative loss-making firms benefitting from incentives.U 
Another type of tax incentive worth mentioning is "tax 
deferrals': which offer a delay in the payment of taxes, typ-
ically in form of an allowance for accelerated deprecia-
tion. In principle, certain forms of tax deferral exist in the 
tax treatment of R&D&I in nearly every country. Most 
of them allow for a full deduction of current R&D&I ex-
penses, which can be regarded conceptually as accelerated 
depreciation, because some of the expenses are assumed 
to generate future income. 
Tax incentives aimed at increasing the patenting activity of 
companies can also be found. In recent years, some gov-
ernments have expanded tax incentives to income from 
IP generated by R&D&I, which is referred to as a "patent 
box" regime. The importance and presence of patent box 
regimes are growing within the tax systems ofEU Member 
States. H.Js This form of tax incentive stems from the Inter-
est and Royalties Directive (2003/49), 16 which reduces or 
eliminates some of the withholding tax on certain royal-
ties. 
13. Nill, supra n. 6, at pp. 10-11. 
14. For instance, "Innovation Box tax system" in the Netherlands, "LITL' in 
Luxembourg, "Patent Income Deduction'' in Belgium, "Patent Box lax 
system" in Spain, "Intangible Asset Depreciation Regime" in Ireland. 
15. The paten! box regime was introduced in Spain byES: Law 16/2007 of 
4 July. The Ninth Additional Provision to this law slates that the palenl 
box regime should enter into force, wilh retroactive effect from 1 January 
2008, once the EU Commission affirms that il is compatible wilh EU State 
aid rules. On 13 February 2008, the European Commission authorized 
the Spanish paten! box regime under the Stale aid rules. As a result of this 
authorization, this patent box regime is applicable with relroaclivc effect 
from I January 2008. 
Currently the Spanish patent box regime is regulated by article 23 of ES: 
Corporate Income Tax Act, National Legislation IBI'D. The amendment 
lo article 23 (contained in paragraph 2 of article 26 of Law 14/20 13) applies 
to operations carried out effective 29 September 2013. 
16. EU Interest and Royalties Directive (2003): Council Directive 2003/49/EC 
of 3 June 2003 on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest 
and Royalty Payments Made Between Companies of Different Member 
States, OJ Ll57 (2003), EU Law IBFD. 
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Diagram 2: R&D direct and indirect support 
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Source: OECD Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 23 October 2013, available at www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm. 
Since the main objective is to enhance technological 
innovation in the private sector, the aim of the patent 
box regime is to provide an additional incentive for com-
panies to retain and commercialize existing patents and 
to develop new innovative patented products. In order 
to create a more attractive R&D&l environment, income 
from patents and certain other R&D&I intangibles that 
originate from R&D&I can benefit from a lower effective 
tax rate under the patent box regime. 
Countries offering R&D&I tax incentives are often 
regarded as a favourable location for internationally mobile 
R&D&I. When efficiently allocated, companies can effec-
tively leverage their global R&D&I infrastructure resulting 
in the development of valuable IP. The tax incentives for 
R&D&I within an overall corporate tax system can also 
play a role in locational decisions of multinationals. Coun-
tries are increasingly concerned about the "hollowing-out" 
of their research base. But such tax incentives have effects 
not only in relation to locational decisions; such measures 
can also determine the allocation of R&D&I investment 
across sectors, firms and projects. 
Offering fiscal incentives to stimulate R&D&I has emerged 
as an increasingly popular policy tool over the past decade. 
In the last 10 years, R&D&I tax incentives have proliferated 
and become more generous. In 2011,26 OECD member 
countries provided tax incentives to support business 
R&D&I, up from 18 in 2004 and 12 in 1995. R&D&I tax 
incentives are also offered by non-OECD member coUI1-
tries, including Brazil, China, India, Russia, Singapore and 
South Africa. Moreover, by 2011, over a third of all public 
support for business R&D&I in OECD member cow1-
© JBFD 
tries was in the form of tax incentives, a share that jumps 
to more than half when the United States - with its large 
direct procurement of defence R&D&I - is excluded. 17 
Some countries rely strongly on R&D tax incentive 
support, as seen in Diagram 2. 
R&D&I tax incentives cover all kinds of companies due 
to the fact that they reduce expenses equally regardless of 
the project the company has been implementing, its size, 
the origin of its capital, as well as the sector of activity it 
takes part in. In addition, R&D&I tax incentives enable 
the companies to decide "where" and "how" to spend on 
R&D&I, as such companies are more capable of evaluat-
ing which projects will be more successful in the market. 
Moreover, R&D&I tax incentives offer a wide range of 
design features to policymakers that allow for their flexi-
ble use for different policy objectives. They can be targeted 
to specific types of R&D&I activities (including innova-
tion activities other than scientific research), they can vary 
by firm size, region or sector and they can be applied dif-
ferently than the various types ofR&D&I expenditures. 
R&D&I tax incentives that are available to all sizes of 
firms can encourage increased investment in all types of 
companies, sectors and research (basic, applied, develop-
mental). However, under general schemes, most R&D&I 
tax benefits tend to be claimed by larger enterprises that 
conduct the lion's share of research. Tax measures aimed 
17. OECD, J'vfaximizing the /Jwefits ofR&D&l tax incentives for innovation, 
Annex I 'iHai11 Features of R&D&l tax incentives prol'isions in selected 
OECD and 11011 OECD cou11tries, 2013" (11 Oct. 2013). 
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Diagram 3: Profitable and loss-making firms and R&D tax incentives 
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Source: OECD Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 23 October 2013, available at www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm. 
at small firms are unlikely to have a significant impact on 
aggregate investment spending, but may encourage inno-
vative expenditures at the margin. Provisions for carry-
ing forward such credits also assist smaller enterprises, 
since, in the early years, they may not be sufficiently prof-
itable to take advantage of the tax incentive. In addition 
to small firms, research contracted to or conducted with 
public research institutions and universities is an increas-
ingly popular target for R&D&I tax schemes. 18 
Moreover, when profits are too low, R&D&I tax incentives 
may have no effect. For this reason, other measures, such 
as refunds and carry-overs, are sometimes offered. For an 
overview of the impact of R&D tax incentives on enter-
prises depending on whether or not they are profitable or 
loss making see Diagram 3. 
3. State Aid Rules 
3.1. Introduction 
The European Commission has set out a complex of State 
aid rules, which is comprised of the articles of the TFEU, 
specific regulations, frameworks and guidelines, all of 
which lay down when aid can be given. Within the Euro-
pean Union, the European Commission is responsible for 
setting up the rules for controlling Member State compli-
ance with the State aid rules and for approving aid. 
The objective of State aid rules is to ensure that govern-
ment interventions do not distort competition and trade 
within the European Union, i.e. they seek to balance the 
need to encourage activities that are anti -competitive with 
18. Tax incentives for Research and Development: trmds ami issues, supra n. 10, 
at pp. 28-29. 
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the need to support activities that contribute towards a 
well functioning and equitable economy. 
The starting point ofEU State aid rules is article 107 of the 
TFEU, which assesses when a specific state measure con-
stitutes State aid. It makes it clear that only state measures 
that constitute State aid are subject to State aid control. 
Further, this article assesses when such State aid measures 
can be compatible and, thus, allowed under the provisions 
of the TFEU. 
Article 107 ofthe TFEU provides for a general prohibi-
tion of State aid, but measures can be declared compat-
ible if the conditions for granting one of the exemptions 
of article 107(2) or 107(3) are fulfilled. The exemptions of 
article 107(2) are automatic exemptions, whereas article 
107(3) gives discretion to the Commission in assessing 
compatibility. 
As stated in section 2., the Commission has developed 
specific approaches that depend on the size of the firm, 
its location, the industry concerned, the purpose of the 
aid, etc. In order to ensure transparency, predictability and 
legal certainty, the Commission has made public the cri-
teria it uses when deciding whether aid measures noti-
fied to it qualify for exemption. These publications take 
the form of regulations, communications, notices, frame-
works, guidelines and letters to Member States. 
The various soft law provisions have, however, typically 
been applied in a rather strict, formalistic way, so there is 
little scope for approving State aid measures that do not 
meet the conditions set out in the provisions. 
© IBFD 
3.2. Definition of State aid according to Community 
rules 
State aid rules apply only to measures that satisfy certain 
criteria set out in article 107(1) of the TFEU. All criteria 
must be fulfilled. If a single criterion is not fulfilled, the 
measure granted is not subject to the State aid rules. These 
criteria are set out in sections 3.2.1. to 3.2.4. 
3.2.1. The aid must consist of a transfer of public 
resources to an organization involved in an 
economic activity (undertakings) 
In this context, public resources include resources granted 
by regional or local authorities, as well as other public 
or private sector bodies designated or controlled by the 
state. Furthermore, the aid does not necessarily need to 
be granted by the state itself. 
It is understood that the term public resources, apart 
from the resources of the State budget or the budgets of 
local public bodies, also covers all other atypical financial 
resources that make it possible for the state to implement 
its basic tasks. 
Financial transfers that constitute State aid may take 
many forms such as capital injections, loan guarantees, 
tax exemptions, etc. 
State aid is costly. It involves the use of State funds that 
could have been used in other domains of government 
(opportunity costs of State aid), as well as the cost of 
raising the funds required (shadow costs of taxation). 
Even assuming that the State aid is employed in the right 
kind of situation and in the right manner, it may still not 
be worth it, especially if its impact is smaller than anticip-
ated (presumably because the market failure is minimal) 
or the costs are high. 19 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has, however, inter-
preted the term "undertaking" in this area in a wide sense 
as any entity that exercises an activity of an economic 
nature and that offers goods and services on the market, 
regardless of the legal form and the method offinancing of 
the entity. Even non-profit entities are included when they 
compete with companies that are profit oriented. 
3.2.2. The measure must confer an advantage on an 
undertaking 
The aid granted must constitute an economic advan-
tage that the undertaking would not have received in the 
normal course of business. This benefit must be granted 
for free or on favourable (non-commercial) terms. 
The benefit can be generated in a passive (refraining from 
collecting public receivables) or an active manner (active 
disbursement of public resources). 
19. 1-I.W. Friederiszick, L.l I. Riiller & V. Veroudcn, European State Aid Control: 
1111 ecoi!Olllicji·amework, in Houdbook ofAutitrust Ecouomics p. 637 (Paolo 
Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2007). 
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3.2.3. The measure granted must be selectil>e 
A measure is selective if it favours only certain undertak-
ings, that is, if it targets particular businesses, locations, 
types of firm, etc. A "selective measure" is the opposite 
of a "general measure'; which applies without distinction 
across the board to all firms in all economic sectors in a 
Member State. 
3.2.4. The aid must distort or have the potential to distort 
competition 
If a measure strengthens the position of the beneficiary 
relative to other competitors, then this criterion is likely 
to be met. 
This criterion is automatically fulfilled if the aid has a 
potential effect on competition and trade between Member 
States. The potential to distort competition does not have 
to be substantial or significant and this criterion applies 
to small amounts of aid and firms with little market share. 
In order to fulfill this requirement, it is sufficient if it can 
be shown that the beneficiary is involved in an economic 
activity and that it operates in a market in which there is 
trade between Member States. 
3.3. Notification procedure under article 108(3) oflhe 
TFEU 
Article 108(3) of the TFEU governs the notification pro-
cedure, pursuant to which Member States must notify 
a scheme involving State aid and the Commission then 
makes a decision regarding its compatibility with the EU 
market. State aid granted without European Commis-
sion approval is viewed as unlawful and has to be recov-
ered. According to article 109 of the TFEU, the Council 
may, however, determine categories of aid that are exempt 
from the notification procedure set out in article 108(3) 
of the TFEU. Consequently, in 2008, the European Com-
mission adopted what is referred to as the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER), which was provided for 
in Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98.20 Its enactment 
crowns a decade-long development of block exemption 
regulations. It expired on 31 December 2013 and will, 
therefore, need to be reviewed. 
The GBER empowers the Commission to declare, by 
means of regulations, that certain specified categories of 
aid are compatible with the internal market and are exempt 
from the notification requirement of article l 08(3) of the 
TFEU. 
The GBER applies to all sectors of the economy with some 
exceptions21 and to "transparent" forms of aid: i.e. grants 
and interest rate subsidies, loans where the gross grant 
20. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008, of 6 August2008, declaring 
certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in applic-
ation of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regu-
lation), OJ L 214, pp. 3-47 (9 Aug. 2008). 
21. Sectoral restrictions arc set out in article I, paragraphs 3-6, of the GBER 
and include specific activities in the fishery & aquaculture sectors, in the 
primary production of agricultural products, the coal sector, the steel 
sector, shipbuilding and the synthetic fibres sector. These provisions 
simplify the procedures for aid granting authorities and allow for a range 
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equivalent has been calculated on the basis of the reference 
rate prevailing at the time of the grant, guarantee schemes, 
fiscal measures (subject to a cap) and some types of repay-
able advances. The GBER is aimed at a wide range of aid 
measures that are considered less problematic in competi-
tion terms, i.e. less distortive. The GBER enables notified 
aid to be granted without the need for approval in indivi-
dual cases where a measure meets the terms of the regu-
lation. Twenty-six areas are covered by it, these include: 
regional aid; 
SMEaid; 
aid to disadvantaged and disabled workers; 
aid for environmental protection; 
risk capital aid; 
training and employment aid; and 
aid for research, development and innovation. 22 
Article 6 of the GBER lays down the maximum amount 
of aid that is block exempted.23 Adopting the GBER Re-
gulation enabled the Commission to set out, in a Regula-
tion, a threshold below which aid measures are exempted 
from the notification obligation under article 108(3) of 
the TFEU even when they do not meet all of the criteria 
of article 107 ( 1) of the TFEU. 
The GBERalso includes an anti-circumvention rule in that 
it specifies that aid may not be artificially divided into sub-
projects so as to escape the notification threshold. Accord-
ing to article 8 of the GBER only aid that has an incentive 
effect shall be exempt. 
On this basis, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) 
No. 1998/2006 to de minimis aid effective 1 January 2007. 
1t sets out a ceiling below which aid is deemed not to fall 
within the scope of article 107(1) of the TFEU and is, there-
fore, exempt from the notification requirement laid down 
in article 108(3) of the TFEU. This Regulation set the de 
minimis ceiling at EUR 200,000 per undertaking granted 
over any period of three fiscal years and thus consider-
ably simplified the granting of small amounts of support. 
It also expired on 31 December 2013 and will, therefore, 
be reviewed. 
3.4. Recovery duty 
The ECJ has held, on several occasions, that the purpose of 
recovery is to re-establish the situation that existed within 
the market prior to the granting of the aid. This is neces-
sary to ensure that the level-playing field in the internal 
market is maintained. In this context, the ECJ has empha-
sized that the recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid 
of measures with horizontal objectives considered to be in the common 
interest. 
22. Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 authorized the Commission to exempt aid to 
R&D, but not for innovation. Since, however, innovation has become an 
EU policy priority in the context of"Innovation Union': one of the flagship 
initiatives of Europe 2020 and, moreover, many aid measures for innova-
tion are relatively minor and create no significant distortions of compe-
tition, Council Regulation (EU) No. 733/2013 of22 July 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of 
horizontal State aid, OJ L 204/11 (31 July2013) amended Regulation (EC) 
No. 994/98to include Innovation among the areas covered by the GBER. 
23. There are 14 different maximum amounts varying from EUR 2 million 
for training to EUR 20 million for aid for fundamental research. 
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is not a penalty but the logical consequence of the finding 
that it is unlawful. It can, therefore, not be regarded as 
disproportionate to the objectives of the TFEU as regards 
State aid. According to the ECJ, the:24 
[R] e-establishment of the previously existing situation is obtained 
once the unlawful and incompatible aid is repaid by the recipi-
ent who thereby forfeits the advantage which he enjoyed over his 
competitors in the market, and the situation as it existed prior to 
the granting of the aid is restored. 
In order to eliminate any financial advantages incidental 
to unlawful aid, interest is to be recovered on the sums 
unlawfully granted. 
In its decision in Commission v. Germany (Kohlegesetz) 
(Case C-70/72),25 the ECJ confirmed, for the first time, 
that the Commission had the power to order the recov-
ery of unlawful and incompatible State aid. The Court 
held that the Commission was competent to decide that a 
Member State must alter or abolish State aid that is incom-
patible with the common market. It should, therefore, also 
be entitled to require repayment of this aid. On the basis 
of this decision and subsequent case law, the Commission 
informed the Member States in a Communication pub-
lished in 1983 that it had decided to use all measures at 
its disposal to ensure that the Member States' obligations 
under article 88(3) of the EC Treaty (now article 108(3) 
of the TFEU) are fulfilled, including the requirement for 
Member States to recover incompatible aid granted unlaw-
fully from the recipient. Currently, Council Regulation 
659/199926 plays an important role in the field of recovery 
of unlawful aid. It is a procedural regulation that applies 
to all administrative procedures in the matter of State aid. 
The Commission's "recovery decision" imposes a recovery 
obligation upon the Member State concerned. It requires 
that the Member State concerned recover a certain amount 
of aid from a beneficiary or a number of beneficiaries 
within a given timeframe. As recovery is the ultimate 
sanction for breaking State aid rules, the non-execution 
of recovery decisions threatens to undermine the credibil-
ity of the Community's State aid policy. For this reason, it 
is essential to the integrity of the State aid regime that these 
decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful 
State aid (hereinafter referred to as "recovery decisions") 
be enforced in an effective and immediate manner. 
A recovery decision must be addressed to the Member 
State that granted the unlawful aid and not to the benefi-
ciary. Member States must implement the recovery deci-
sion by seeking reimbursement of the unlawful aid from 
the beneficiary. Under article 14 of Regulation 659/1999, 
recovery must be effected without delay and in accord-
ance with the national procedures of the Member State 
concerned, provided that they allow for immediate and 
effective recovery, taking into account that recovery of aid 
is limited to l 0 years from the day the aid was awarded to 
the beneficiary. 
24. IT: ECJ, 4 Apr. 1995, Case C-348/93, Commissio11 v. Italy, para. 27. 
25. DE: ECJ, 12 July 1973, Case C-70/72, Commission v. Germany. 
26. Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999, of 22 March 1999, laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC, OJ L 83/1 (27 
Mar. 1999). 
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As the Commission is not under a duty to warn potentially 
interested persons, including the beneficiary of the aid, of 
the measures that it is taking in respect of unlawful aid 
before it initiates the administrative procedure, the mere 
fact that the beneficiary was not aware of the existence of 
requests for information addressed by the Commission to 
the national authorities does not have the effect of depriv-
ing them of the legal effect vis-a-vis the beneficiary, in par-
ticular as regards the interruption of the limitation period. 
The beneficiary of State aid cannot, except in exceptional 
circumstances, have a legitimate expectation that aid was 
lawful and be relieved of the obligation to repay the aid, 
unless it has been granted in compliance with the provi-
sions of article 108 of the TFEU. 
The Commission also applies Deggendotj(Joined Cases 
T-244/93 and T-486/93)27 in a systematic manner. This 
case law enables the Commission, if certain conditions 
have been satisfied, to order Member States to suspend 
the payment of a new compatible aid to a company until 
that company has reimbursed previously granted unlawful 
and incompatible aid that is subject to a recovery decision. 
4. R&D&I Promotion and State Aid Policy 
The justification for granting State aid to support R&D&I 
is to encourage firms to undertake more research than 
they would otherwise take on under normal market con-
ditions. There is ample empirical evidence that shows 
that the market does not function optimally in relation to 
research. The Europe 2020 communication makes explicit 
reference to the role of State aid policy, considering that 
it can "actively and positively contribute [ ... ] by prompt-
ing and supporting initiatives for more innovative, effi-
cient and greener technologies, while facilitating access 
to public support for investment, risk capital and funding 
for research and development': 
But as the Commission remarks, the main concern related 
to R&D&I aid for companies is that rival companies' 
dynamic incentives to invest are distorted and possibly 
reduced. There are three distinct ways in which R&D&l 
aid can distort competition in product markets: 
when a company receives aid, this generally strength-
ens its position in the market and reduces the return 
on investment for other companies. When the reduc-
tion is significant enough, it is possible that rivals will 
cut back on their R&D&I activity. In addition, when 
the aid results in a soft budget constraint, even the 
recipient of the aid may have a reduced incentive to 
innovate (crowding out effect). 
also, it may keep inefficient firms in the market, i.e. 
the aid granted may lead to overcapacity in declining 
industries or in sensitive sectors (maintaining an inef-
ficient market structure); and 
27. DE: EC}, 13 Sept. 1995, Joined Cases T-244/93 and T-486/93, TWD 
Textilwerke DeggendOtfGmbH 1'. Commission of the European Conummities. 
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furthermore, the aid may enable the beneficiary to 
engage in exclusionary practises with the result that 
competitors that did not receive aid will be excluded 
from the market. 28 
It is well recognized that the European Union would 
benefit substantially from an increase in the level of 
R&D&I because this would lead to higher growth levels 
in the Union. These R&D&I policies may include a wide 
range of measures, such as public financing or tax in cent-
ives. But not all of these measures fall within the scope 
of the State aid rules. Aid to R&D&I is only one of the 
various tools Member States can use, i.e. only one element 
of R&D&I policies. Moreover, data from the State aid 
Scoreboard indicates that State aid to R&D&I accounts for 
only 11% of the overall public expenditure on R&D&U9•30 
As stated in section 3.1., the legislation of the European 
Union contains a general ban on granting aid from State 
resources, but this principle expressed in article 1 07(1) 
of the TFEU is a rule with exceptions. In particular, aid 
to R&D can be exempted from the general prohibition 
against State aid pursuant to the exception in article 1 07(3) 
(c) of the TFEU (aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities) or sometimes under the provisions of 
article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU (projects of common Euro-
pean interest). 
The Commission has a surprisingly wide margin of dis-
cretion with regard to exempting State aid under article 
107(3) of the TFEU, but this wide margin of discretion is 
partly circumscribed by two instruments: the Community 
framework for State aid for research and development and 
innovation31 (R&D&I Framework or Framework),32 which 
sets out the conditions Member States should respect 
when granting aid to promote R&D&I and lays down the 
criteria used by the Commission in assessing the compat-
ibilityofState aid for R&D&I, and the GBER,33 specifically 
articles 30-37, which exempt a large number of categories 
of R&D&I from prior notification34 where they meet the 
conditions set out in the general GBER. 
These rules were designed to cover more than just techno-
logical R&D&l, therefore, they do not prevent or hinder 
support in favour of new and emerging forms of R&D&I 
activities. 
28. Commission StaffWorking Paper, supra n. 4, alp. 6. 
29. Id., alp. 2. 
30. Slate aid to R&D&l currently only concerns a limited subset, i.e. less than 
1/8 of public R&D&I expenditure. See European Commission, Competi-
tion DG, Revision oflhe Stale aid rules for research and development and 
innovation p. 6 ( 12 Dec. 20 12). 
31. Commission, Community Pramework for Slate Aid for Research and 
Development and Innovation, 2006/C 323/01, 0} C 323/1 (30 Dec. 2006). 
32. '!'he R&D&l Framework (2006/C 323/01) is the successor of two previ-
ous frameworks, i.e. lhe 1986 and 1996 frameworks. 
33. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008. The GBER allows Member 
Slates lo grant aid in favour ofSMEs, R&D, innovation, regional develop-
ment, training, employment, risk capital and environmental protection, as 
well as aid measures promoting entrepreneurship, such as aid for young 
innovative businesses, newly created small businesses in assisted regions, 
and female entrepreneurs. 
34. Note lhallhe regulation of Slate aid resls on a system of ex ante autho-
rization, according to which Member Slates have lo notify the Commis-
sion of any plan lo granl Stale aid and this aid must nol be pul inlo ctTecl 
before il has been approved by the Commission. 
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In view of the expiry of the R&D&I Framework and the 
GBER on 31 December 2013, the European Commission 
has commenced a revision process. On the one hand, a 
new draft GBER on R&D&I aid was released for public 
consultation on 8 May 2013 and, after three public con-
sultations in the context of the revision of the GBER, the 
Commission will probably adopt the final Regulation in 
the second quarter of2014. 
On the other hand, and as preparatory step for the new 
rules, on 10 August 2011, the Commission published 
a mid-term review on the application of the R&D&I 
Framework,35 thereby delivering on commitment 13 of 
the Innovation Union Communication.36 As a second 
step, which took place from 20 December 2011 to 24 
February 2012, it sought further feedback from Member 
States and stakeholders on the application of the R&D&I 
rules through public consultation. On the basis of replies 
received to the questionnaire published, the Commis-
sion prepared a first draft of a revised R&D&I Frame-
work, which was expected to be published for consulta-
tion in the summer of2013, but was not published until 
19 December 2013.37 
The European Commission has fixed the criteria appli-
cable to the evaluation process for determining the com-
patibility of R&D&I measures with State aid rules. These 
criteria are laid down in the Community framework for 
State aid for research and development and innovation38 
(R&D&I Framework or Framework). This Framework sets 
out types ofR&D&I activities that may be funded through 
aid together with eligible costs, permitted aid intensities 
and thresholds that are permissible following the Com-
mission's approval. 
The Framework applies to State aid for R&D&I and will 
be applied in accordance with other Community policies 
on State aid, other provisions of the founding Treaties and 
legislation adopted pursuant to those Treaties. 
As stated in the Framework, the objective is to enhance 
economic efficiency through State aid and thereby con-
tribute to sustainable growth and jobs. Therefore, State aid 
for R&D&I shall be compatible if the aid can be expected 
to lead to additional R&D&I and if the distortion to com-
petition is not considered to be contrary to the common 
interest, which the Commission equates, for the purposes 
of this framework, with economic efficiency. The aim of 
this Framework is to ensure this objective and, in particu-
lar, to make it easier for Member States to better target the 
aid to the relevant market failures. 
The rules on R&D&I contained in this Framework are a 
flexible package of measures that can be used by Member 
States to tailor their R&D&I support according to their 
35. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/statc_aid/lcgislation/rdi_ 
mid_tcrm_review_en.pdf. 
36. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, Europe 2020 Plagship Initiative, Innovation Union, 
SEC:(2010)1161, C:OM(2010)546 final (6 Oct. 2010). 
37. The European Commission published this draft for the purpose of obtain-
ing views on it. The deadline to send contributions was 17 February 2014. 
38. R&D&I Framework (2006/C: 323/0 1). 
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national preferences, needs and specificities. On the basis 
of an economic analysis39 a series of measures are offered to 
Member States to grant aid and to better target their funds 
to measures that are, on balance, beneficial to the common 
interest. The Framework recognizes that without public 
support R&D&I might be lower than what is socially desir-
able, but, at the same time, it highlights the possible risks of 
distortions in competition between firms and in the loca-
tion of investments across the European Union. 
According to general Treaty principles, State aid cannot 
be approved if the aid measure is discriminatory to an 
extent not justified by its State aid character. With regard 
to R&D&I, it should, in particular, be underlined that the 
Commission will not approve an aid measure that excludes 
the possibility of exploitation of R&D&I results in other 
Member States. 
The Framework recalls the overall methodology, based on 
the "balancing test': the objective of which is to show that 
R&D&I aid raises economic efficiency without causing 
excessive distortion of intra-Community trade and com-
petition. The balancing test is based on an economic 
approach, consisting of three questions assessing the pos-
itive and negative effects of the planned measure. In partic-
ular, the balancing test specifies that State aid for R&D&I 
is only acceptable in so far as it: 
(1) addresses a well-defined market failure; 
(2) is well targeted; and 
(3) does not distort competition too much, i.e. it can be, 
on balance, compatible with the common market. 
In light of these positive and negative elements, the Com-
mission balances the effects of the measure and deter-
mines whether the resulting distortions adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest. The analysis in each particular case will be based 
on an overall assessment of the foreseeable positive and 
negative impacts of State aid. In doing this, the Commis-
sion does not work mechanically, but makes an overall 
assessment based on the proportionality principle. 
The starting point of the balancing test is the identifica-
tion of a market failure that hampers R&D&I. Once the 
market failures hampering R&D&l are clearly identified 
as possible distortions of competition and trade that may 
be triggered by State aid, the Commission wants proof of 
the advantages of using State aid instead of other measures. 
The next step is to determine whether the aid has an 
incentive effect, i.e. that it will cause R&D&I activity to 
increase in terms of size, scope, amount expended and 
speed with which R&D&I activity is undertaken, while, at 
the same time, being proportional, which requires that the 
amount of required aid be linked to the degree of market 
failure. In conclusion, in all cases, it must be demonstrated 
that the incentive effect and proportionality test have been 
satisfied. 
39. The R&D&! framework (2006/C: 323/01) represented the first application 
of the refined economic approach advocated by the 2005 State Aid Plan, 
C:OM(2005) 107 final (7 June 2005). 
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A small number of cases require a detailed assessment if 
the Commission considers that a more precise analysis of 
the incentive effect of the aid is necessary to avoid undue 
distortions. 
The Framework, since 29 August 2008, has been comple-
mented by the GBER, which, as stated previously, auto-
matically approves different types of aid measures for these 
categories of State aid, without a need to notify them to 
the Commission. In particular, the GBER provides for 
the registration of aid for R&D&I for all the above mea-
sures (excluding aid for Innovation Clusters and Aid for 
Process and Organizational Innovation in Services) within 
certain financial limits. Aid provided under the GBER has 
to be registered with the Commission within 20 days from 
the date it was granted. Aid above the limits is subject to 
formal notification for Commission approval under the 
Framework. 
At the beginning, Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 authorized 
the Commission to exempt aid for R&D, but not for inno-
vation, but since innovation has become an EU policy pri-
ority in the context of an "Innovation Union'; one of the 
Europe 2020 flagship initiatives and, moreover, many aid 
measures for Innovation are relatively small and create no 
significant distortions of competition, Council Regulation 
(EU) No. 733/2013 of 22 July 20 l3 has amended Regu-
lation (EC) No. 994/98 to include innovation among the 
areas covered by the GBER. 
5. R&D&I Tax Incentives as State Aid 
Article l 07 of the TFEU states that: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through Stale resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in 
so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the common market. 
In this context, R&D&I tax incentives, can be labelled as 
State aid. 
State aid in direct tax matters can be perceived based on 
the traditional theories that support the use of taxation for 
non-fiscal purposes, seriously questioning their compat-
ibility with EU law. 
One instrument that is used to encourage private R&D&I 
investment is tax measures, in fact, tax incentives for busi-
ness R&D&I are not a new topic. As early as the 1980s 
many countries used this instrument. Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands and, outside Europe, Australia, Canada, 
Japan and the United States have a longstanding experience 
with such tax measures. In recent years, however, a number 
of European countries have (re)introduced or reinforced 
such schemes. Included in the list of countries that do not 
use tax incentives for R&D&I at all are countries with high 
R&D&I intensity such as Finland, Germany and Switzer-
land, as well as countries with low R&D&I intensity such 
as Cyprus, Estonia and the Slovak Republic. 40 
40. Nil!, supm n. 6, alp. 3. 
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The Commission is aware that econometric studies con-
sistently conclude that reducing R&D&I costs leads to in-
creased business expenditure on R&D&I in the medium 
to long term and, therefore, that R&D&I tax measures, 
overall, have an incentive effect on enterprises. In fact, 
paragraph 5( l)( 6) of the R&D&I Framework requires 
Member States to provide the Commission with evalua-
tion studies on the incentive effects, i.e. the extent to which 
undertakings have increased their R&D&I expenditure 
due to the R&D&I tax incentives. 
As the Commission has pointed out:41 
An increasing number of Member Slates use fiscal measures to 
stimulate Business Expenditure on R&D (hereafter referred lo 
as "R&D fiscal measures"). Depending on their design options 
R&D fiscal measures may qualify as general measures or as State 
aid. Article 87.1 of the EC Treaty and the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice set out the conditions under which R& D fiscal 
measures qualify as State aid (hereafter referred lo as "R&D fis-
cal State aid measure': 
A comprehensive summary of the application of these 
conditions is provided in the 1998 Commission notice 
on the application of the State aid rules to measures relat-
ing to direct business taxation.42 
According to ECJ case law, in order to determine whether a 
tax measure constitutes State aid the main criterion is that 
the measure provide an exception to the application of the 
tax system in the Member State. The common system appli-
cable should thus first be determined to verify whether the 
measure departs from its general scope. It must then be 
examined whether the exception favours certain under-
takings and if the differentiation within the system may be 
justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax system. 
Thus, State aid is only involved if a tax reduction is excep-
tional with respect to the tax system to which it belongs. 
According to the notice, measures pursuing general eco-
nomic policy objectives through a reduction of the tax 
burden related to certain production costs, such as R&D, 
are general measures where they are effectively open to 
all undertakings on an equal access basis and thus do not 
constitute State aid. As a result, when examining whether a 
tax measure constitutes State aid or not, the emphasis is on 
the selectivity or specificity criterion of article 87( l) of the 
EC Treaty (now article 107(1) of the TFEU). An R&D&I 
tax measure shall be considered to be selective notably 
if its potential beneficiaries are restricted, for example, 
according to their size (to SMEs, for example), location 
or sector. The fact that some firms or sectors benefit more 
than others from certain deductions, including accelerated 
depreciation of certain investments, depends on the inten-
sity with which they avail themselves of such factors. This 
does not at all mean that such reductions constitute State 
aid, provided they are effectively open to all undertakings 
on an equal access basis. 
41. Memorandum on the Community framework on Slate aid for research 
and development and innovation (R&D&I) (4 May 2006), available al 
h llp:/ I ec.europa.eu/ compe lilio n/ stale _aid/reform I arch ivc _does/ rd i_ 
cn.pd( 
42. Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules lo measures 
relating lo direct business taxation (98/C 384/03), Oj C 384/3 (10 Dec. 
1998). 
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6. Conclusions 
This article highlights that the Commission has wide 
discretion in deciding whether a State aid measure is 
exempted under article 107(3) of the TFEU but, in prac-
tice, the Commission has limited its discretion to approve 
State aid thorough secondary legislation and soft law, spe-
cifically the R&D&I Framework and the GBER. 
If the Commission did not use such secondary legislation 
and soft law, the Commission would be exposed to lob-
bying by certain Member States based on their specific 
political situations.43 For this reason, it can be concluded 
that the use of secondary legislation and soft law enables 
the European Commission to resist political pressure from 
Member States and strengthens its position with respect 
to the Member States. 
The use of secondary legislation and soft law may, however, 
also be considered a tool for directing the aid policies of 
Member States, i.e. a tool aimed at achieving indirect har-
monization or "positive integration''.44 
This article now turns to the "balancing test': As stated 
in section 4., the Framework applies this test in order to 
determine what kind of State aid for R&D&I is acceptable. 
On the one hand, it should be emphasized that this balanc-
ing test requires that the aid target a well-defined market 
failure. With regard to the existence and magnitude of 
market failures, it should be pointed out that the market 
failures associated with this kind of aid may relate to the 
fact that the social return on R&D&I investment is higher 
than the private return. 
On the other hand, the balancing test has been criticized 
due to the high level of legal uncertainty it entails. This 
unavoidable effect is due to the fact that the balancing 
test does not depend on procedural criteria; instead, it 
applies an economic approach to R&D&I State aid. An 
economic assessment of State aid is difficult, which makes 
it impossible to predict in advance the results thereof. This 
unpredictability stems from the assumptions that the 
Commission relies on in applying the test rather than the 
circumstances of the particular State aid at issue. 
The balancing test entails a complex study of the impact of 
State aid, i.e. it requires knowledge of what its impact may 
be and whether it will achieve its objectives. It is unclear, 
however, how competition is factored in by Commission 
or how the overall impact on competition is compared 
to the overall positive effects of the aid in question, for 
example. This leads, unavoidably, to legal uncertainty. 
It is true that legal uncertainty is an undesirable effect, and 
that a higher level of legal certainty can be achieved by 
introducing procedures in the application of the balanc-
ing test, however, it is arguable that doing so may reduce 
the flexibility of the balancing test. It is even questionable 
43. Chapter I: l11trodrtctio11 to State aid law a11d policy, in Europea11 Co/111111111ity 
Law of State Aid p. 16 (Kelyn Bacon ed., Oxford University Press 2009). 
44. M. Blauberger, From11egative to positive i11tegmtion? Europea11 State Aid 
CO/Itrol through soft a11d hard law, Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies, Discussion Paper 04/04, 2008. 
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whether or not an economic test is really necessary in the 
area of State aid. 
These considerations suggest that the balancing test should 
be improved through the use of more precise guidelines 
and examples ofits application by the Commission and by 
limiting its application to the most complex of cases. For 
other cases, i.e. those that are not likely to create important 
distortions in the internal market, appropriate thresholds 
should be implemented, under which the balancing test 
would not be required. 
It is also arguable, however, that the exact size of the market 
failure depends on the difference between social and 
private returns, which, in turn, depends on a large number 
of other factors, such as market structure, the ability to 
appropriate IP, the patent system, the importance of the 
innovation, the R&D&I production function, etc. Nev-
ertheless, it is certainly possible to investigate whether a 
market failure is likely to exist at all and whether it is sig-
nificant. In other words, while a qualitative assessment is 
possible, a quantitative approach will not be very reliable 
in most cases.45 
Focussing now on a different topic, it can be stated that, 
although governmental support for R&D&I does not 
consist exclusively of forms of State aid subject to the 
R&D&I Framework (in fact, there are other supporting 
mechanisms not governed by the R&D&I Framework), 
European State aid law may represent an obstacle to the 
progress ofR&D&I among Member States. This handicap 
puts the European Union in a worse position in relation to 
its main traditional and emerging competitors (China, Japan, 
Korea, the United States and the other BRIC countries), 
who are not subject to the R&D&I Framework and, there-
fore, enjoy a wider scope of action. 
Thus, although the EU State aid rules need to be strin-
gent enough to prevent serious distortions to competition 
within the European Union, there is a very real possibility 
that they represent a threat to the European Union's exter-
nal competitiveness. 
The Lisbon European Council, in March 2000, wanted 
the European Union to become "the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world". In order 
to realize this objective, however, attention must be paid 
to the constantly shifting balance between internal com-
petition and external competitiveness because, although 
the purpose of these rules is to ensure healthy competi-
tion within the European Union (thus implying that the 
rules are internal policies), they may have an impact on the 
competitive position ofEU enterprises inside and outside 
the European Union. 
As stated earlier in this section, the main traditional and 
emerging competitors are not subject to the R&D& I Frame-
work and, therefore, enjoy a wider scope of action. A 2008 
study46 revealed that there is no equivalent to the R&D&I 
45. Friederiszick, Roller & Vcrouden, supra n. 19, at p. 637. 
46. Impact of the Community l'ramework for State Aid for Research and 
Development and Innovation on European Union Competitiveness 
(Summary of the study done by Technopolis at the request of the Direc-
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Framework in the legislation of any of the European 
Union's main competitors. There are, in some instances, 
specific national regulatory frameworks, however, they are 
less specific and give public decision makers more room 
for manoeuvre. 
As stated in the 2008 study, while the United States does 
not have a regulatory equivalent to the European Frame-
work for State aid for R&D&I, there are two regulatory 
systems, one for small firms and another for larger firms. 
For small enterprises, the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) has established a single set of rules to be applied 
by all agencies. For larger firms, the various official agen-
cies have their own rules and procedures. In these situ-
ations, it is the Codes of Federal Regulations that provide 
the general State aid framework and that define the terms 
and conditions applicable to the various programmes. 
With regard to China, the study points out that the R&D&I 
Framework also has no Chinese counterpart. Since the late 
1990s, however, the central government has been attempt-
ing to regulate (to protect IP, in particular). On 29 Decem-
ber 2007, President Hu Jintao signed a decree that will 
bring the Science and Technology (S&T) Advancement 
Law into force from l July 2008. This law should make it 
possible, inter alia, to improve investment in S&T activi-
ties, in particular through the introduction of financial, 
banking and taxation policies that benefit Chinese firms. 
The Law also aims to make the distribution and integra-
tion of S&T resources more efficient. Finally, it seeks to 
encourage industry to play a larger role in technological 
innovation by creating a package of preferential policies 
to promote Chinese innovations. 
In Japan, the law does not lay down any general proce-
dures on State aid. It is up to each funding body to decide 
on both the content of the programmes and how they will 
be undertaken. There is, however, a law on the proper 
implementation of state subsidy budgets, which has been 
in force since 1958. This law governs the implementation 
of all state subsidies. Its purpose is to prevent fraud and 
embezzlement and to ensure that budgets are correctly 
spent. It is the only law on this subject. 
Taking the above into consideration, it can be concluded 
that as long as there is no equivalent State aid control 
outside of the European Union, European firms are at a 
disadvantage with regard to global competition as a result 
of the R&D&I Framework rules. It is true that European 
rules on State aid and public procurement are designed 
to guarantee free and fair competition within the inter-
nal market, but it cannot be ignored that such rules have 
an impact on external competitiveness. In this context, it 
has been assumed that European competition and global 
competitiveness cannot always be achieved at the same 
time, but that the two goals have to be balanced against 
each other. 
to rate General of Enterprises, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industryand 
Employment) June 2008, available at: http://archives.dgcis.gouv.fr/20 12/ 
www.industrie.gouv.fr/innovation/resume-ctude-aides-etat-ang.pdf. 
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In order to escape this dilemma, there is evidence47 that 
the Commission has been attempting to promote EU 
State aid rules beyond EU borders. The Commission has 
made efforts to transfer EU State aid rules horizontally (to 
non-EU countries), as well as vertically(atthe WTO level), 
with differing levels of success. 
With regard to horizontal transfer, three major groups of 
counties can be distinguished: the EFTA countries, acces-
sion countries and associated countries. 
The EFTA countries have signed the European Economic 
Area Agreement (EEA Agreement)Y Articles 61 and 62 
of the EEAAgreement are identical to articles 107 and 108 
of the TFEU. In addition, Protocol 26 to the Agreement 
entrusts the EFTA Surveillance Authority "with equivalent 
powers and similar functions to those of the EC Com-
mission". The latter protocol also incorporates the more 
detailed "Procedural Regulation" (Council Regulation 
(EC) 659/1999)49 into the EEA Agreement. Compared to 
the European Union, the main difference ofEFTA State aid 
control is its limited scope due to the fact that agriculture 
and fisheries are not covered by the Agreement. 
Although Switzerland, 5° despite being an EFTA Member, 
has not ratified the EEA Agreement and, therefore, is not 
subject to the Surveillance Authority's control, the trans-
fer ofEU State aid rules to EFTA countries is almost com-
plete. 
Turning to the accession countries, they must adopt EU 
State aids rules before their accession. This requires nego-
tiations51 between the Commission and the accession 
country, the result of which is the adoption by the acces-
sion country of national State aid legislation that trans-
poses the EU State aid rules and lays down the procedure 
for State aid control. But since EU State aid rules cannot 
be implemented "once and for all", the candidate country 
must follow a transition procedure, pursuant to which the 
candidate country must gradually align its national laws to 
the EU State aid rules. 52 The real adjustment of the acces-
47. M. Blaubcrger & R.U. Kramer, European Competition vs. Global Com-
petitiveness: Transferring EU rules 011 State aid and Public Prowrement 
beyond Europe, CCP Working Paper I 0-10, available at http:/ /ssrn.com/ 
abstract= 1656961. 
48. Agreement on the European Economic Area of 171vlarch 1993, 0)],] 
(1993), EU Law IBFD. 
49. Regulation No. 659/1999. 
50. Switzerland, although a signatory and member ofEFIA, failed to ratify 
the EEA Agreement and is not, therefore, part of the European Econmic 
Area. 
51. As Blauberger and Kr\imer point out, in practice, the acquis commu-
nautaire is divided for negotiations into different chapters that can be 
assessed and negotiated separately during accession preparations. State 
aid control belongs to the competition chapter, which is typically among 
the last chapters to be finalized. Public procurement issues used to be 
part of the chapter on free movement of goods but candidate countries 
now have to discuss these issues in a separate chapter. See Blauberger & 
Kramer, supra n. 48, at p. 14. 
52. As Blauberger and Kramer remark, candidate countries had to establish 
national monitoring authorities which, until accession, were supposed 
to play a similar role as the Commission normally plays at the European 
level. Emulating the procedure of European State aid control, the grant-
ing of State aid became contingent on notification to and approval by the 
respective national monitoring authorities. Furthermore, in their assess-
ment ofindividual aid measures, national authorities were bound to apply 
the entire State aid acquis, including the present and future secondary leg-
islation, frameworks, guidelines and other relevant administrative acts in 
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si on countries' State aid policies takes place just after acces-
sion, when national State aid legislation becomes obsolete 
and the exclusive competence to control State aid is trans-
ferred to the Commission. 
Unless all negotiation proceedings are successfully con-
cluded, including questions regarding State aid rules, a 
candidate country cannot become an EU Member State. 
For this reason, the Commission's strategy for extending 
European State aid rules to accession countries has been 
successful. 
Thirdly, associated countries have concluded Stabilization 
and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the European 
Commission. The aim of these bilateral agreements is to 
encourage the adoption of rules in associated countries 
that might once become accession candidates. Each SAA 
contains a State aid prohibition similar to that of article 107 
of the TFEU and a general obligation to assess competition 
cases on the basis of criteria arising from the competition 
rules applicable in the Community. This approach to State 
aid control is the same as in accession countries: domes-
tic State aid legislation needs to be passed and a national 
monitoring authority has to be established. 
On the other end of the spectrum, vertical up load of EU 
State aid rules to the multilateral or plurilateral WTO is not 
always easy because this task requires the consensus of the 
most powerful EU partner and rival: the US government. 
Moreover, the discretionary power of the European Com-
mission to authorize State Aid on the basis of article I 07(3) 
of the TFEU (especially due to the economic approach of 
the balancing test as mentioned in section4.) has dramati-
cally reduced the possibility for Member States and busi-
ness to determine ex ante to what extent policy measures 
of this kind will be allowed. This uncertainty can discour-
age the business climate and divert it to other regions of 
the world. 
7. Recommendations 
The European Commission has to ensure that the new 
R&D&I Framework will create a competitive playing field 
within the European Union, but, at the same time, will 
not put the European Union at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to other competitor emerging economies that 
provide State aid to their companies. 
It would be appreciated if, first, the Commission were to 
refrain from enforcing EU State aid rules so strictly in all 
situations in order to take into consideration the impact 
of subsidization in competitor economies. Currently, 
although the potential harm to EU industry caused by 
state subsidies of third country governments is addressed 
through the common commercial policy instruments (for 
example, the WTO dispute settlement process), there is a 
force in the Community, as well as the case law of the Court(s). During 
the early years after accession, the Commission had to solve some very 
specificlegal questions regarding the period immediately before accession 
and assess a considerable number of State aid measures. See Blauberger & 
Kramer, supra n. 48, at p. 15. 
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risk that EU external competitiveness will be harmed due 
to third country subsidies. 
In addressing State aid control, the "matching clause'' is 
an excellent tool for Member States. The matching clause 
is contained in paragraph 5( 1)(7) of the current R&D&I 
Framework, which states that: 
In order to address actual or potential direct or indirect distor-
tions of international trade, higher intcnsitics than generally per-
missible under this section may be authorized if- directly or 
indirectly- competitors located outside the Community have 
received (in the last three years) or arc going to receive, aid of 
an equivalent intensity for similar projects, programs, research, 
development or technology. However, where distortions of in-
lernalionaltrade are likely to occur after more than three years, 
given the particular nature of the sector in question, the reference 
period may be extended accordingly. 
If at all possible, the Member State concerned will provide the 
Commission with sufficient information to enable it to assess the 
situation, in particular regarding the need to take account of the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by a third-country competitor. If 
the Commission does not have evidence concerning the granted 
or proposed aid, it may also base its decision on circumstantial 
evidence. 
The matching clause is a tool aimed at avoiding actual or 
potential direct or indirect distortions of international 
trade. The matching clause has no economic rationale (the 
fact that competitors may have been aided with regard to 
ineffective projects does not mean that European gov-
ernments have a reason to undertake such projects them-
selves) but is aimed at taking into account the competitive 
advantage enjoyed by a third-country competitor. 
For the time being, the matching clause, which allows for 
greater aid intensity, has not been used by any Member 
State but it would be an unbeatable tool in the fight against 
the negative consequences of EU State aid rules on the 
external competitiveness of the European Union. 
Secondly, in order to provide legal certainty to stakehold-
ers, the impact of State aid rules on Horizon 2020 needs to 
be clarified. Stakeholders must have a prior and clear idea 
of the way in which the activities they intend to undertake 
are influenced by State aid rules. 
Thirdly, governments should review their R&D&I tax 
incentive schemes because it is MNEs that benefit the most 
from R&D&I tax incentives since they can use tax planning 
to maximize their support for R&D&I activities. 
The OECD highlights that the reason for this is that MNEs 
typically operate as integrated global businesses and are 
able (within the limits of the law) to plan their tax affairs 
to take advantage of differences in tax rates and regimes 
across tax jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the fact that 
tax rules are designed to protect the tax base in many 
countries, MNEs are often able to mostly avoid corpo-
rate income tax on R&D&I returns, for example, by using 
offshore lP holding companies. In addition to this, many 
states are reluctant to impose controlled foreign company 
(CFC) rules that would tax on a current basis (rather than 
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deferred or exempt basis) royalty income received by off-
shore holding companies of resident MNEs.53 
As a direct consequence of this fact, the OECD remarks 
that this creates an unlevel playing field that is disadvan-
tageous to purely domestic and young firms. 54 Further, it 
should be noted that tax rules sometimes enable MNEs 
53. Supporting Investment itt Knowledge Capital Growth and Innovation pp. 
37-38 (OECD 2013), available at hllp:/ /www.occd-ilibrary.org/industry-
and-scrvices/supporting-investment-in-knowlcdgc-capilal-growth-and-
innovation_9789264 I 93307-en. 
to shift profits from intellectual assets (i.e. patents). The 
OECD has already focussed its attention on this matter and 
has included this issue in its Action Plan on Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting, 55 suggesting that the important aspects 
of tax schemes should be reviewed in reference to signifi-
cant R&D&I players. Moreover, the OECD also suggests 
that well-designed direct support, such as grants and con-
tracts, may be more effective in stimulating R&D&J than 
previously thought, especially for young firms. 56 
54. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Reform R&D&I tax 
systems to boost ituwvation and help youngjinns (OECD, 10 Oct. 2013). 
55. OECD, Action Plan 011 Base Erosiott and Profit Shifting (2013), Interna-
tional Organizations' Documentation IBPD. 
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